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1. INTRODUCTION 
It is commonly alleged that a substantial proportion of lawsuits are frivolous or 
“strike” suits, that is, lacking merit and filed only in the hopes of obtaining a 
favorable settlement.’ The handling of such suits has given rise to popular and 
scholarly criticisms of American civil procedure, on grounds both of efficiency 
and fairness. Indeed, in certain areas such as medical malpractice, antitrust, and 
corporation law, the asserted prevalence of frivolous suits is commonly cited as 
an argument for law reform. For example, recent critiques of treble damages in 
antitrust have emphasized the supposed encouragement such damages give to 
strike suits. 
The fairness objection to frivolous lawsuits is that such suits can result in 
opportunistic persons obtaining payments to which they are not entitled, at the 
expense of innocent defendants who may be viewed as defrauded or under duress. 
The efficiency objection is that the rent-seeking occasioned by frivolous suits 
wastes resources both directly and indirectly. Direct costs include resources used 
in filing and defending such suits, as well as costs of investigation and discovery 
as defendants attempt to distinguish frivolous from genuine claims. Indirect costs 
stem from the additional trials required because the presence of frivolous plaintiffs 
in the population of litigants interferes with the settlement of genuine claims. 
This article develops a model of litigation and settlement in the presence of 
frivolous lawsuits, which I define as suits that have a sufficiently low chance of 
prevailing at trial that they would not be brought but for the prospect of settlement. 
The analysis does not address suits in which the prospect of judicial error or jury 
confusion at trial permits a plaintiff to obtain a settlement that is undeserved 
according to some external normative standard. Instead, I take a strictly positive 
view of the law and treat all suits expected to prevail at trial as genuine. Neither 
do I address suits that turn out ex post to have little basis in law, but that ex ante 
seemed plausible. There are undoubtedly many such cases brought, but it is 
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difficult to call them frivolous, since the plaintiffs believe with some reason that 
the law may entitle them to a recovery.* 
There has developed a substantial literature on litigation and settlement under 
imperfect information. Most contributors to this literature, however, have as- 
sumed the plaintiff’s threat to go to trial to be credible, thus ruling out the pos- 
sibility of frivolous lawsuits. In order to explain how frivolous suits can persist, 
it is necessary to explain why defendants might be willing to offer positive amounts 
in settlement to a frivolous suitor. The first formal analysis of the problem was 
by David Rosenberg and Steven Shave11 (1985), who showed that even when the 
defendant fully realizes that a claim is frivolous, the plaintiff may still obtain a 
positive settlement. This is because the defendant is willing to pay a settlement 
up to the amount of his defense costs in order to avoid having to respond to the 
plaintiff’s complaint. This result, however, depends upon two particular assump- 
tions of the Rosenberg-Shave11 framework. First, they assume that the plaintiff, 
and not the defendant, can commit to making a take-it-or-leave-it settlement offer.3 
Second, and more importantly, they assume that once suit has been brought, the 
defendant must spend a substantial amount in defense before the plaintiff has to 
spend any substantial amount offensively. 
In reality, however, a defendant who knows a suit to be frivolous can merely 
respond with a blanket denial of the plaintiff’s allegations. This will suffice to 
avoid a default and will shift the burden of the next expenditure back to the 
plaintiff. Since the plaintiff’s ultimate threat to go to trial is not credible, the 
defendant may be able to ignore it. The Rosenberg-Shave11 model, while helping 
to explain those nuisance suits that settle for small amounts, cannot explain either 
why defendants might react to frivolous suits with more than a minimal response, 
or why frivolous suits might settle for amounts greater than the cost of a minimal 
response. 
The main reason that frivolous suits are not always met with a blanket denial 
and refusal to negotiate, of course, is that the defendant rarely knows the merits 
of the claim with certainty. Since refusing to take a valid claim seriously can be 
quite costly, a frivolous plaintiff may be able to take advantage of the defendant’s 
uncertainty regarding the claim’s validity to extract a substantial settlement. 
This article presents a model that explains strike suits as a result of defendant 
uncertainty regarding the merit of plaintiffs’ claims. The model views the settle- 
ment process as an asymmetric information game. Specifically, I assume that 
*Ivan P’ng (1983) considers this possibility in a model in which an informed defendant 
chooses whether to offer an exogenous settlement to an uninformed plaintiff. The defendant 
in P’ng’s model may be induced to offer a positive amount to a plaintiff who would not 
go to trial. It is difficult to describe P’ng’s plaintiff as a strike suitor, however, since he 
does not know when he brings suit whether his case is a winner. Furthermore, P’ng’s 
equilibrium is not subgame perfect; in it the defendant responds to an incredible threat by 
the plaintiff. 
31f the defendant can commit to a take-it-or-leave-it offer following suit, the defendant will 
make and a frivolous plaintiff will accept any offer infinitesimally greater than zero. Since 
a frivolous plaintiff can foresee he will be unable to resist such an offer, he will never sue 
if the cost of filing suit is strictly positive. Since in reality the potential strike suitor is 
often a one-shot litigant while the potential defendant is often a well-established person or 
business with incentives to establish a reputation, it is unclear why the plaintiff and not 
the defendant can commit to making a take-it-or-leave-it offer. Cooter and Ulen (1988, p. 
486) show that the Rosenberg-Shave11 argument can be extended to a situation in which 
the negotiation is expected to lead to the Nash cooperative bargaining solution, provided 
that trial costs are asymmetrical. The Nash solution, however, is well defined only in the 
setting of complete information. 
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there are two possible types of plaintiffs: frivolous and genuine. Each plaintiff 
knows whether his claim is frivolous or genuine, but the defendant must base the 
decision whether to offer settlement on his estimate of the probability that the 
suit is genuine, as updated by any inferences he can draw from the plaintiff’s 
decision to bring suit. When the opportunity to bring a frivolous lawsuit is com- 
petitive, in a sense defined below, the equilibrium number of frivolous claims is 
strictly proportional to the number of genuine claims. And, among the properties 
of the resulting equilibrium is that frivolous suits completely dissipate the surplus 
from settlement bargaining. 
One component of this argument has also been put forward by Lucian Bebchuk 
(1988), in an article that appeared after the original version of this paper was 
written. Bebchuk investigates the circumstances in which an imperfectly informed 
defendant would be willing to tolerate the risk of settling with a frivolous plaintiff 
in order to obtain the benefit of avoiding going to trial against a genuine plaintiff. 
He finds, not surprisingly, that an increase in the defendant’s probability estimate 
that the plaintiff’s claim is valid makes it more likely that the defendant will offer 
a positive amount in settlement, and also increases the amount of the defendant’s 
offer if it is forthcoming. More interestingly, Bebchuk finds that an increase in 
the defendant’s trial costs will increase both the likelihood of a positive settlement 
offer and the amount of an offer if it is forthcoming. This is because higher trial 
costs raise the defendant’s benefit from settling with valid claimants and makes 
him more willing to tolerate the cost of settling with strike suitors. 
Bebchuk’s analysis, however, is incomplete in that he examines only the de- 
cision problem of one party to an interactive situation-the defendant’s incentives 
to offer settlement before trial. He ignores the issue of the frivolous plaintiff’s 
incentive to bring suit in the first place, assuming at the outset an exogenously 
fixed number of frivolous plaintiffs. This assumption precludes consideration of 
two important features of frivolous lawsuits. First, it ignores the fact that the 
defendant can draw inferences about the plaintiff’s private information from the 
fact that the plaintiff is willing to bear the cost of filing suit. 
Second, and more importantly, in equilibrium the plaintiff’s decision to bring 
suit both depends upon and influences the defendant’s settlement strategy. For 
example, if there is no cost to bringing suit (as Bebchuk assumes), an unlimited 
number of frivolous plaintiffs would bring suit if they anticipated a positive set- 
tlement. But this would drive the proportion of valid claims to zero, eliminating 
the defendant’s incentive to settle. More generally, if filing suit is costly, the 
proportion of frivolous suits should adjust until the returns from suit are driven 
to the competitive level. It should be apparent that solving one party’s decision 
problem in this context is not the same thing as solving for the equilibrium out- 
come. 
Accordingly, when the plaintiff’s decision to bring suit is appropriately rec- 
ognized as endogenous, the nature of the outcome changes substantially. This 
result should be familiar to those acquainted with the economic literature on rent- 
seeking, which holds that the equilibrium amount and outcome of redistributive 
activity depends critically on whether access to that activity is competitive.4 It is 
the possibility that frivolous plaintiffs will compete to bring their lawsuits that 
makes the potential cost of the phenomenon so high. Bebchuk’s exogeneity as- 
sumption, in contrast, leads him to focus on what I show below to be a special 
case (technically, a comer solution). 
The organization of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the basic 
model of frivolous lawsuits, solves for its equilibrium, and derives some results 
4The classic exposition of this idea is found in Posner (1975); see also Tullock (1967). 
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in comparative statics. Section 3 discusses the model’s implications for a number 
of policy proposals for civil court procedure that have been proposed to alleviate 
the frivolous suit problem. Section 4 presents a variation on the basic model in 
which there is a continuum of plaintiff types and shows that the flavor and several 
results from the two-type model carry over. Section 5 summarizes the analysis 
and suggests some possible extensions.5 
2. THE MODEL AND ITS EQUILIBRIUM 
Assumptions 
Consider a situation in which a plaintiff can plausibly claim an entitlement to legal 
compensation. The potential plaintiff knows with certainty whether or not he is 
actually injured, but the defendant knows only the probability of injury conditional 
on the initial event. To illustrate, consider a customer at a retail store who slips 
and falls on a floor that the store negligently failed to keep dry. The customer 
knows whether he has been hurt, but the store only knows that such falls result 
in injury some proportion of the time. A second example is a products liability 
case in which injury is undisputed, but the plaintiff is not entitled to damages if 
he was contributorily negligent in using the product. While the plaintiff knows 
whether he was negligent, the defendant cannot know in advance of trial. 
The litigation process of the model occurs in four stages. First, a random event 
determines whether a potential plaintiff is injured. Second, the plaintiff chooses 
whether to sue; this depends on both the expected settlement to follow and the 
plaintiff’s expected gains from trial should there be no settlement. Third, the 
defendant chooses a single take-it-or-leave-it settlement offer. Fourth, the plaintiff 
chooses whether to accept the offer, and if the offer is nonpositive, whether to 
drop the case or to proceed to trial. At trial the plaintiff’s information is revealed, 
and judgment is awarded if and only if the plaintiff is actually injured. The structure 
of the settlement game is shown in Figure 1. Dotted lines indicate imperfect 
information; they connect two nodes of the game between which the defendant 
cannot distinguish. 
5Several other articles shed light on various features of suits by plaintiffs who might not 
go to trial. Ordover and Rubenstein (1986) analyze a bargaining game that can be reinter- 
preted as a model of strike suits. They assume that the only way the suit can end is for 
one of the parties to give up, however, and are primarily interested in explaining the duration 
of a variable bargaining period. Salant (1984) develops a litigation model in which an 
informed plaintiff has already filed suit at the outset and is about to make an offer to an 
uninformed defendant. Although Salant does not explicitly consider the issue of strike 
suits, his approach is sufficiently general that a reinterpretation of his notation could yield 
some insights about the issue. He is concerned primarily, however, with the information 
transmitted by the amount of the settlement offer. Also recently, a paper by Nalebuff 
(1987) explores a model of settlement bargaining in which it is the plaintiff rather than the 
defendant who is uninformed regarding the extent of injury. Because rejection of a small 
settlement demand can make the plaintiff’s threat to litigate incredible, plaintiffs are led 
in Nalebuff’s model to exaggerate their demands in order to limit the bad news they learn 
from a rejection. He interprets such exaggerated threats as nuisance suits. While the model 
is undoubtedly interesting and useful, one may question whether it captures the features 
of strike suits that have received recent public attention, particularly in that the plaintiff 
does not know whether the suit is frivolous when he makes his demand. A more realistic 
and complicated model, which combines features of Nalebuff’s model with the one de- 
veloped here, will be necessary in order to explore the aspects of bilaterally asymmetric 
information that characterize actual disputes. 
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Sue Sue 
Defendant 
offers settlement S 
(WA-t-c,-WA-~) (-4 - c, 4) 
FIGURE 1. Structure of basic model 
One might object that courts cannot always reliably tell whether the plaintiff’s 
claim is valid. Recall, however, that I interpret validity in positivistic terms, so 
that the validity of the plaintiff’s claim depends solely on the court’s expected 
reaction to his information. All I assume is that plaint~s can accurately foresee 
on average how courts will react to their information. 
This framework involves a number of important assumptions. First, the as- 
sumption of a single offer is a restrictive one. I abstract from this issue since my 
main goal is not to provide a general solution to the bargaining problem but to 
focus on how bargaining over just claims can induce frivolous claims to arise. 
Whatever the defendant’s settlement strategy, he faces a tradeoff between paying 
frivolous claims and risking trial against genuine claims. 
Second, the assumption that the defendant makes the offer simplifies the anal- 
ysis considerably, in that information regarding the plaintiff’s type is conveyed 
only by the fact of suit and not by the amount of the offer. Which version of the 
model is a better description of reality may vary according to the legal context, 
and may depend upon the type of claim and area of substantive law. 
Third, I assume that the defendant possesses no private information regarding 
the merits of the case. If the defendant’s conduct is a major issue in the lawsuit, 
as in an antitrust case with allegations of conspiracy or in a suit centered on the 
defendant’s alleged negligence, a more complicated model than this one will be 
needed. In such cases, however, it is more difficult to characterize the plaintiff’s 
claim as frivolous; the problem may instead be one of a frivolous defense. 
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Fourth, I abstract from the fact that in an actual lawsuit the defendant may 
wish to spend resources to investigate the claim’s validity, for example by paying 
for a medical examination or by engaging in civil discovery. A strike suitor’s 
decision will be affected by the prospect of such discovery, so that easily dis- 
provable claims might be cheaply deterred. Since complete information is likely 
to be prohibitively costly, one can interpret the defendant’s probability estimate 
as that remaining after optimal investigation. I also assume that an injured plaintiff 
cannot credibly communicate the validity of his claim to the defendant before 
trial. 
With these preliminaries aside, suppose that some event occurs that with some 
probability, or among some proportion of a population, creates a legally valid 
claim. A potential plaintiff is accordingly of one of two types-injured or frivolous, 
with the original probability of injury denoted as p. E [0, 11. The extent of injury 
is denoted as A, and the likelihood of a finding of liability given that there is injury 
is denoted as w E [0, 11; the expected award at trial for an injured plaintiff equals 
wA.~ 
The cost of trial is denoted as t for the plaintiff and as k for the defendant. In 
addition, a plaintiff must spend c to bring the lawsuit initially; this amount includes 
the cost of preparing and filing a complaint and making the fact of the lawsuit 
known to the defendant. Once suit has been brought, this initial cost is sunk and 
does not affect the decision to proceed to trial. The net expected gain from trial 
for an injured plaintiff, once suit has been brought, then equals WA - t; the 
expected cost for the defendant if an injured plaintiff goes to trial is WA + k.’ 
Given this framework, I solve for the unique sequential equilibrium to this 
game. Each plaintiff type chooses a strategy that maximizes his return from suit 
given the strategies of the defendant and the other plaintiff type. The defendant 
chooses a strategy that minimizes his payout given the plaintiffs’ strategies and 
given his own best estimate of the plaintiff’s type. The defendant’s probability 
estimate is formed by updating his original beliefs according to Bayes’ rule. Ran- 
domized strategies are admissible and indeed are necessary for the existence of 
equilibrium. 
Solution of the model 
The requirement of sequential equilibrium implies that the game is solved by 
reasoning backwards from its last stage, where the plaintiff must choose between 
accepting the defendant’s offer S and going to trial. A frivolous plaintiff could 
obtain S by accepting the offer, could obtain --t by rejecting the offer, and could 
obtain zero by dropping the lawsuit. He would therefore accept any positive 
settlement offer, and would drop the lawsuit if faced with a zero or negative 
settlement offer. An injured plaintiff, by the same token, could obtain S by ac- 
cepting the offer, could obtain WA - t by rejecting the offer, and could obtain 
zero by dropping the lawsuit. He would therefore accept a settlement if and only 
if it were at least as great as his expected gain from trial, WA - t.* Note that the 
61 allow for the possibility that a genuine plaintiff is not assured of recovery at trial. The 
reader may alternatively wish to interpret WA as the expected value of the judgment, 
recognizing that potential plaintiffs can differ with respect to the extent as well as the 
probability of recovery. 
‘The defendant may also have costs prior to trial. Such costs are sunk by the time of 
settlement and hence do not affect the optimal settlement strategy, so I ignore them. In a 
model analyzing frivolous defenses as well as frivolous claims, such costs might become 
an important factor. 
*I assume without loss of generality that a plaintiff will always accept a settlement offer 
when indifferent. 
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initial filing cost has no effect on the decision to accept settlement, since once 
suit is brought it is sunk. 
It should be apparent that the defendant will never make a settlement offer in 
an amount other than the reservation prices of the two types, 0 and WA - t. Any 
offer above WA - t will be accepted by both types of plaintiffs, and given this 
there is no reason for the defendant to make such an offer any larger than nec- 
essary. Similarly, any offer strictly between zero and WA - t will be rejected by 
the genuinely injured plaintiffs and accepted by the frivolous plaintiffs, and as 
long as the genuine plaintiffs do not accept there is no reason to offer the frivolous 
ones anything at all. 
Whether the defendant prefers to offer nothing or WA - t depends upon his 
estimate of the probability that the plaintiff has a valid claim, conditional on suit 
having been brought. Denote this conditional probability as pl; its value depends 
both on the prior probability po, and on the probabilities that the two types of 
plaintiffs bring suit. A genuinely injured plaintiff will always sue, because his net 
payoff from doing so is at least WA - t - c; which I have assumed is strictly 
positive.9 Denote as 4 the probability that an uninjured plaintiff chooses to bring 




PO + (1 - PO)4 
(1) 
The value of p, ranges from 1 to p. as q ranges from 0 to 1. 
The defendant has the choice of paying a settlement of WA - t to all plaintiffs, 
or offering no settlement and going to trial against only those plaintiffs who are 
genuinely injured. Since going to trial costs the defendant WA + k, he strictly 
prefers to settle the case if WA - t < pl(wA + k), or equivalently, if the posterior 
probability that the claim is valid exceeds a threshold level: 
WA - t pf = ~ 
WA + k 
If the posterior probability of injury is less than the threshold p?, the defendant 
strictly prefers to go to trial. And if p1 = pi+, the defendant is indifferent between 
settlement and trial. 
The defendant’s optimal strategy, therefore, can be described by a single vari- 
able (+, which denotes the probability that he offers the higher settlement. If 
p1 < pf, then CT = 0. If p, > pr, then CT = 1. And if p1 = pf , the defendant is 
indifferent between settlement and trial and is willing to choose (T at any value 
between zero and one.‘O 
9This assumption is essential to the formulation of the problem. If WA - t < c, then in 
equilibrium neither frivolous nor injured plaintiffs bring suit. 
loThe analysis would be similar if frivolous plaintiffs could expect some small return VA 
from trial. So long as their expected return were less than their trial costs t, they would 
still drop out before trial, and the defendant’s incentives would be unchanged. A slightly 
more complicated situation would arise if frivolous plaintiffs could expect a return from 
trial that exceeded trial cost t, but was less than the combined trial and filing costs t + c. 
In this case frivolous plaintiffs would not bring suit if they expected no settlement to be 
offered, but if they ever did bring suit their filing cost would be sunk and they would then 
be willing to go to trial. The defendant would then have to choose between settling for 
WA - t with all plaintiffs, and settling for VA - t with the frivolous plaintiffs and going to 
trial against the rest. The analysis of this variation follows along precisely the same lines 
as the text, and results in a similar equilibrium. 
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Note also that associated with the threshold value of p1 is a threshold value of 
9, equal to: 
’ 
* _ POU - PT) PO@ + k> 
- (1 - POIPT = (1 - POXWA - t) 
If uninjured plaintiffs bring suit with probability greater than q*, then the posterior 
probability of injury will be less than p T, and the defendant will prefer to go to 
trial. 
Now consider a frivolous plaintiff’s decision regarding the probability of suit, 
q. (Given the original probability of injury po, it is equivalent to view him as 
choosing the value of pl. I adopt this convention in the notation, since it makes 
the argument somewhat clearer.) His net return from suit equals @(WA - t) - c, 
since he must spend c to file and has probability v of getting a settlement 
WA - t. Accordingly, he will prefer to sue if and only if the probability o exceeds 
the threshold level: 
C u* =I ~ 
WA - t (4) 
in which case he will choose q = 1 (or equivalently, p1 = pa). If the defendant 
offers settlement with probability less than CF*, an uninjured plaintiff will want to 
choose q = 0 (or equivalently, p1 = 1). And, if the settlement probability (T exactly 
equals LT*, uninjured plaintiffs will be indifferent regarding suit and willing to 
choose any value of q E [0, I], and any value of p1 E [po, 11. 
A unique and stable equilibrium is defined by the two simultaneously determined 
variables, p1 and o. The equilibrium, however, can be of two types, depending 
upon whether the prior probability of injury, po, is greater or less than the threshold 
posterior probability PT. 
PROPOSITION 1. If the prior probability of injury is above a threshold level, the 
unique equilibrium involves all potential plaintiffs bringing suit, whether injured 
or not, and all suits resulting in settlement at the injured plaintiff’s reservation 
price. 
PROOF: If p. > pf, then it necessarily follows that p1 > pt. Then the defendant 
must choose u = 1 in equilibrium. But then an uninjured plaintiff’s return from 
suit is WA - t - c > 0, so he chooses 4 = 1 and p1 = po* in equilibrium. 11 
In this first type of equilibrium, the prior probability of injury is so high that 
the defendant wants to settle with all the strike suitors in order to avoid going to 
trial against the injured plaintiffs. This occurs because only a limited number of 
persons are eligible to bring suit, so there are not enough potential claimants to 
drive the profits from bringing a strike suit to the competitive level. Since potential 
strike suitors are scarce, they earn a rent in equilibrium. Accordingly, I refer to 
this outcome as a “restricted entry” or noncompetitive equilibrium. 
This is the outcome that Bebchuk identifies. It is a corner solution in the 
following sense: all possible frivolous plaint~fs bring suit. More would sue if they 
were eligible to do so, but their number is bounded. The limit on potential suitors 
makes the probability that the claim is valid effectively exogenous.” 
“In Bebchuk’s model, the degree of injury varies over a continuum, so that some injured 
plaintiffs reject the offer and go to trial in equilibrium. For a more complete analysis of 
the variable-injury model, see section 4 below. 
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Table 1. Simulation of threshold value pT 
11 
t+k 




- = 0.25 
t+k 
A 
- = 0.33 
A 
t+k 
- = 0.50 
A 
w = 0.25 0.33 0.20 0.00 
w = 0.50 0.60 0.50 0.33 
w = 0.75 0.71 0.64 0.50 
w = 1.00 0.78 0.71 0.60 
Source: Equation 5 in text. 
To get a sense of the importance of this type of equilibrium, it is helpful to 
calculate some benchmark estimates of the threshold p?. The University of Wis- 
consin Civil Litigation Research Project provides the best available data on liti- 
gation expenditure; they find that total trial costs in a typical lawsuit range from 
one-fourth to one-half of the potential stakes. l2 If one assumes that the plaintiff’s 
and defendant’s trial costs are approximately equal, then: 
WA - t 
zw-fk 
pf=---.-z A 




Table 1 shows the threshold value of p1 for various parameter values. For 
example, when an injured plaintiff is certain to win (w = 1) and where total costs 





= 0.33 , then pT = 0.71. Note that the 
) 
threshold rises with the probability of liability w and is inversely related to the 
stakes-cost ratio. But for some plausible parameter values, the prior probability 
of injury must be substantially above 50% to support a restricted entry equilibrium. 
The value of the prior probability p. will depend upon the specificity and ex- 
clusiveness of the initial event, as well as upon any additional information the 
defendant can obtain through investigation. If the defendant is unable to identify 
the occurrence of the initial event or the class of persons who may have partic- 
ipated in it, the value of p. will be small. To illustrate, if in the slip-and-fall case 
mentioned above, the set of potential plaintiffs is limited to those who actually 
are observed to fall, then p. will be fairly high. But if a customer can plausibly 
claim to have fallen without the store’s knowledge at some time in the recent 
past, the set of potential plaintiffs may include all customers who have used the 
store; p. would then represent the prior probability of the compound event that 
a fall occurred and that it resulted in injury. The more difficulty the defendant 
has in defining the initial event, then, the less likely is a restricted entry equilib- 
rium. 
I will spend relatively little time discussing the restricted entry case or its 
comparative statics, as Bebchuk’s analysis treats it thoroughly. It is worth ob- 
serving, however, which factors determine whether this kind of equilibrium ob- 
tains . 
lZSee Trubek et al. (1983). 
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PROPOSITION 2. A restricted entry equilibrium is more likely to obtain, other things 
being equal, when 
(a) the prior probability of injury is higher: 
(b) the defendant’s trial costs are higher; 
(c) the plaintiff’s trial costs are higher; 
(d) the expected stakes are lower. 
PROOF: By differentiation of Equation 2 with respect to p,,, k, t and WA. 11 
It is worth observing that the likelihood of a restricted entry equilibrium is 
unaffected by the level of filing costs, c. This is because the threshold probability 
of injury required for such an equilibrium depends only on the defendant’s relative 
costs of trial and settlement. The defendant obviously cares about the expected 
stakes and about his own trial costs. He also cares about the plaintiff’s trial costs 
since they affect the reservation price at which an injured plaintiff will settle. 
Since filing costs are sunk at the time of trial, however, they do not affect the 
plaintiff’s reservation settlement level, and so do not affect the restricted entry 
equilibrium. (If filing costs were to rise so high as to deter genuinely injured 
plaintiffs from bringing suit, of course, they would preclude frivolous suits as 
well). 
When the prior probability p. is less than the threshold pT, the equilibrium is 
of a different type. The posterior probability p1 must exactly equal the threshold 
pT, and the defendant’s probability of settlement must exactly equal o*. 
PROPOSITION 3. If the prior probability of injury is below a threshold level, there 
is a unique equilibrium such that: 
(a) All genuinely injured plaintiffs bring suit; 
(b) Some but not all uninjured persons bring suit; 
(c) Some strike suitors receive positive settlements while others drop their suits, 
and some injured plaintiffs fail to receive any settlement and consequently go to 
trial. 
PROOF: An equilibrium is determined by values of c and pl that are best responses 
to each other. Let p. < pt , and suppose (+ > (+ *. Then a frivolous plaintiff’s return 
from suit is strictly positive, so his best response is q = 1 and p1 = po. But then 
defendant’s best response is o = 0, which contradicts the supposition. Conversely, 
suppose (T < (+*. Then a frivolous plaintiff’s return from suit is strictly negative, 
so his best response is q = 0 and p1 = 1. But then defendant’s best response is 
(T = 1, again a contradiction. A similar argument shows that p1 # p? cannot be 
an equilibrium. And, since defendant is indifferent about offering settlement when 
p1 = pT and a frivolous plaintiff is indifferent about suit when (+ = &+, each 
strategy is a best response to the other. 11 
In addition to being unique, the equilibrium is stable under an appropriately 
constructed dynamic adjustment process. If too many frivolous plaintiffs bring 
suit, the defendant will refuse to offer settlement, leading frivolous plaintiffs to 
exit until the defendant is again willing to settle with positive probability. If too 
few frivolous plaintiffs bring suit, the defendant will always offer settlement, 
leading frivolous plaintiffs to enter until the defendant is again willing to let some 
cases go to trial. 
In this second type of equilibrium, competition among strike suitors drives the 
profits from bringing a strike suit to zero. Accordingly, I refer to this outcome as 
a competitive equilibrium. In many situations it will be the more plausible out- 
come. 
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The entries of Table 1 can also be interpreted as the equilibrium proportion of 
valid claims when there is free entry to bringing suit. For instance, if the total 
costs of litigation are one-third of the amount at stake, and if a valid claim has a 
75% chance of winning, then approximately 36% of all suits will be frivolous. If 
total costs of litigation are one-half the amount at stake and a valid claim has a 
75% chance of winning, half of all suits will be frivolous.‘3 
If the prior probability p. is exactly equal to the threshold p;, a continuum of 
knife-edge equilibria exist, with (7 taking values in the interval [u*, 11. In all such 
equilibria, all potential strike suitors bring suit, for if they did not, the defendant 
would strictly prefer to offer settlement and suit would be profitable. If u were 
less than the threshold 8, only the injured plaintiffs would sue, leading the 
defendant strictly to prefer v = 1. In all equilibria with settlement probability 
above 8, strike suitors earn positive profits; they earn zero profits in the equi- 
librium with u = @. 
Comparative statics 
The comparative statics of the restricted entry equilibrium are uninteresting. As 
observed above, all cases settle, and the proportion of valid claims is just the 
exogenous value 1 - po. None of the other exogenous variables affect either the 
probability of settlement or of suit, although they do affect the settlement amount. 
The competitive equilibrium, in contrast, depends upon all the exogenous vari- 
ables. Consider first the equilibrium values of two endogenous variables: pl, the 
proportion of claims that are valid, and U, the proportion of suits that settle. 
PROPOSITION 4. In competitive equilibrium, the proportion of lawsuits that are 
frivolous: 
(a) is invariant to the prior probability of injury; 
(b) increases with the trial costs of the defendant; 
(c) increases with the trial costs of a genuinely injured plaint$fi 
(d) decreases as the amount of the expected judgment increases; 
(e) is invariant to the cost of$ling a lawsuit. 
PROOF: By differentiation of Equation 2 with respect to po, k, t, WA, and c. 11 
PROPOSITION 5. In competitive equilibrium, the proportion of lawsuits that settle 
(a) is invariant to the prior probability that an injury occurred; 
(b) is invariant to the trial costs of the defendant; 
(c) increases with the trial costs of a genuinely injured plaintlyfi 
(d) decreases as the amount of the expected judgment increases; 
(e) increases with the cost ofJiling a lawsuit. 
PROOF: By differentiation of Equation 4 with respect to po, k, t, WA, and c. 11 
Note that although the equilibrium values of u and p1 are simultaneously de- 
termined in equilibrium, the equations defining them, 2 and 4, are independent. 
13For readers who distrust mixed strategy equilibria, it may be first observed that since 
the equilibrium is unique, no other strategy, pure or mixed, can persist. Second, the 
equilibrium is also stable. Third, one can postulate a slightly more complex model in which 
individual defendants differ in their trial cost k and individual plaintiffs differ in their entry 
cost c. This would imply a unique pure strategy equilibrium. As Harsanyi (1973) has 
demonstrated, the equilibrium of such a variable-cost model approaches in the limit the 
mixed-strategy equilibrium of the simple model as the range of costs is shrunk to a single 
point. 
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Hence it is possible to perform comparative statics by working with a single 
equation. 
~oposition 4 states that in competitive equilibrium the same fraction of suits 
will be frivolous no matter how implausible or unlikely the plaintiff’s claim is ex 
ante. The underlying intuition is that it is just this fraction that makes a defendant 
indifferent between settling and going to trial, and in equilibrium the defendant 
must be indifferent between the two. (If the prior probability is sufficiently large, 
of course, the equilibrium will be of the restricted entry type.) 
Similarly, the filing cost does not affect the number or proportion of frivolous 
suits, since it does not affect the defendant’s willingness to settle either directly 
or indirectly. While changes in filing cost do have effects in equilibrium, such 
effects are entirely concentrated on the frequency of settlement. This result is 
perhaps surprising; it implies that policies that aim to discourage strike suits by 
increasing the costs of filing will not work, so long as the filing cost is still below 
a valid claim’s settlement value. Raising c above WA - t will discourage frivolous 
claims, but at the cost of discouraging valid ones as well. 
The reason why higher defendant’s trial costs increase the relative proportion 
of strike suits is that higher defense costs make trial less attractive for the de- 
fendant and increase his willingness to settle; accordingly, more strike suitors 
enter. Similarly, an increase in the plaintiff’s trial costs t also increases the equi- 
librium proportion of strike suits. This is because higher costs reduce the amount 
needed to induce an injured plaintiff to settle. The defendant will therefore be 
more willing to settle and will tolerate a higher proportion of frivolous suits in 
order to do so. (Indeed, by a similar argument one may see that any policy that 
reduces a genuinely injured plaintiff’s return from trial will increase the proportion 
of strike suits.) 
Accordingly, the popular wisdom that strike suits are an especially severe 
problem in the fields of antitrust and medical malpractice may be explained by 
the complexity and high costs of both trying and defending such claims. Similar 
reasons may also explain assertions that strike suits are common in the areas of 
securities law and products liability, and in the class action setting as well. 
Finally, an increase in the expected judgment amount, WA, will reduce the 
proportion of frivolous lawsuits. This is because an increase in the stakes raises 
the amount necessary to settle the case and reduces the relative importance of 
trial costs. The defendant will be more willing to risk the costs of trial and will 
tolerate fewer frivolous suits in equiiibrium.14 
If this result seems counterintuitive, consider an example of two claims that 
might be alleged against a grocery store: a spinal injury from a slip and fall, and 
an overcharge on a can of soup. A customer claiming to have been overcharged 
is more likely to be indulged, because contesting the claim is too expensive to be 
worthwhile. The grocery is more likely to contest the slip and fall case, in contrast, 
since the amount of damages justifies the defense. One should therefore expect 
the equilibrium proportion of frivolous overcharge claims to be higher. 
This result has at least one notable policy implication: detrebling antitrust dam- 
ages should increase the proportion of frivolous suits brought, contrary to common 
140f course, individual parties may find it wo~hwhile to increase their trial expenditures 
t and k in cases with higher stakes. Whether the total effect is an increase or reduction in 
frivolous suits depends on the elasticity of trial costs with respect to the expected stakes. 
If, for instance, expenditure is proportional to the stakes, a change in the expected judgment 
will have no effect on the equilibrium proportion of frivolous suits. Most empirical evidence 
suggests, however, that trial expenditure is inelastic with respect to the stakes, implying 
that higher stakes will on balance reduce the proportion of strike suits. 
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assertions. This implication, however, depends on the assumption that genuinely 
injured plaintiffs are still willing to bring suit for actual damages. Some number 
of antitrust claims are sufficiently complicated and uncertain that their expected 
recovery value would fall below their trial costs if damages are detrebled. Antitrust 
defendants and their political advocates may wish to label such claims as frivolous; 
under such a definition detrebling damages would indeed eliminate such suits, as 
well as the purely meritless suits that accompany them in equilibrium. Whether 
or not such marginal claims should be brought, of course, depends as a matter 
of social policy on their relative costs and benefits in terms of encouraging efficient 
market conduct. I would prefer to reserve the label “strike suit” for those suits 
that are purely without merit as a matter of positive law. Whether it is desirable 
on efficiency grounds to change the substantive law of antitrust to eliminate 
genuine claims is a separate issue. 
As for Proposition 5, its underlying intuition is that the equilibrium settlement 
probability must leave a frivolous plaintiff indifferent whether to bring suit. A 
marginal increase in filing costs will make suit less attractive, requiring a corre- 
sponding increase in the probability of settlement. Note that if bringing suit is 
costless, entry by strike suitors eliminates settlement entirely, forcing all genuinely 
injured plaintiffs to trial. An increase in the expected award makes suit more 
attractive and hence decreases the equilibrium settlement frequency. An increase 
in the plaintiff’s trial cost will also make suit less attractive by reducing the 
settlement amount, WA - t. Therefore it also requires an increase in the equilib- 
rium settlement frequency. 
A~uly~is of social welfare 
For purposes of evaluating social welfare, the number of valid claims or the 
probability of settlement are not of ultimate concern. More important are the total 
costs of litigation and the net payments made and received by the various parties. 
Net payments by defendants reflect the extent to which the liability system can 
deter inefficient behavior and encourage optimal precaution. l5 Payments received 
by genuine plaintiffs reflect the system’s ability to achieve compensation for injury. 
Both types of payments are also important for purposes of distributional equity 
generally, and total litigation costs measure the legal system’s administrative 
efficiency. 
Let us take the prior probability of injury as given, and first consider 
distributional effects of litigation. The number of lawsuits filed, denoted as 




The total number of cases going to trial is Nt = ~(1 - a), or substituting into 
Equation 4: 
With perfect competition in filing suit, frivolous plaintiffs earn zero expected 
profits in equi~brium. Since the defendant chooses the settlement amount to leave 
150n this issue, see Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1988). 
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an injured plaintiff indifferent between settlement and trial, the net expected gains 
to injured plaintiffs equals p,,(wA - t - c). Net expected loss to the defendant is 
just N,o(wA - t) + pO(l - c)(wA + k) = pO(wA + k). 
Denote as L the total expected litigation costs. Since the cost of each suit is c 
and the cost of each trial is (t + k), expected litigation expenditures are: 
+p,,(t+k)(w$;L;‘) =po(c+t+k) (8) 
Equation 8 has an interesting interpretation. Total expenditure on litigation in 
competitive equilibrium exactly equals the amount that would be expended if only 
valid claims were brought and if all suits went to trial. Indeed, since there is no 
incentive to bring a frivolous claim absent settlement, a ban on settlement would 
have absolutely no effect on the total costs of litigation. Rent-seeking by strike 
suitors completely exhausts the surplus from settlement bargaining.16 
PROPOSITION 6. In competitive equilibrium, the expected social cost of litigation 
would be unaffected by a ban on settlement. The expected social cost of litigation 
would be increased by an increase in either filing costs or trial costs. 
PROOF: By inspection of Equation 8. 11 
Proposition 6 implies it would not be desirable to attempt to discourage frivolous 
suits by raising real filing costs, even though doing so would increase the pro- 
portion of cases that settle. The extra costs incurred per suit would more than 
outweigh the decrease in trial costs incurred. Moreover, the entire cost increase 
would be concentrated on injured plaintiffs, undercutting the goal of compensa- 
tion. Increasing the plaintiff’s real trial costs would similarly increase expected 
litigation costs while undercutting compensation. An increase in defendant’s real 
trial costs would also increase total costs but would at least raise the deterrent 
value of litigation. 
3. APPLICATIONS TO POLICY ISSUES IN CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 
In this section, I apply the competitive equilibrium analysis to a number of policy 
changes in civil procedure that have been proposed to deal with the strike suit 
phenomenon. 
Stricter proof and pleading requirements 
Some critics of current procedure have proposed stricter pleading and proof re- 
quirements, or other rules that would require plaintiffs to engage in a higher degree 
of preparation before filing suit. The ostensible goal of such proposals is to raise 
the cost of bringing frivolous claims relative to valid ones and hence to improve 
the average merit of cases brought. Since such requirements would reduce the 
amount of preparation needed at trial, it is argued, they would not necessarily 
change the total cost of litigation for genuine plaintiffs. 
i6This result depends upon the assumption that all plaintiffs face the same initial cost in 
bringing suit; i.e., that rent-seeking is perfectly competitive. If potential plaintiffs differed 
in their values of c, those with lower c would earn positive rents in equilibrium, and not 
all the gains from bargaining would be dissipated. 
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I model such proposals as increasing the fraction of total litigation costs incurred 
when filing, that is, as raising c and lowering t by an equivalent amount. Since 
increasing c has no effect on the frequency of strike suits, while decreasing t 
decreases their frequency, the net result is a reduction in strike suits. 
To see the effect on the probability of settlement, let the variable z denote the 
cost that is shifted forward by the stricter procedures. Filing costs would then 






Differentiating 9, one finds that settlement becomes more frequent as costs are 
shifted toward the beginning of the lawsuit. 
Nonetheless, Equation 8 shows that a stricter pleading rule would have no 
effect on total expected costs. While it would reduce both the number of strike 
suits and the number of trials, it would increase costs in all suits that settle before 
trial, and the three effects precisely balance. Furthermore, the welfare of each 
type of litigant would be unchanged, so there would be no effect on either com- 
pensation or deterrence. 
English rule of litigation finance 
Some commentators have recommended that the U.S. adopt the English practice 
for allocating costs, under which the losing party must indemnify the winner for 
his cost of litigation. Under the prevailing American rule, in contrast, each party 
bears his own costs regardless of the outcome of trial. Proponents of the English 
rule have conjectured that its adoption would reduce both the general level of 
legal expenditure and the number of strike suits in particular. I have elsewhere 
attempted to cast doubt on the former claim (Katz, 1987), and the model presented 
here implies little support for the latter claim as well. 
Under the English rule, a prevailing plaintiff not only recovers the stakes A but 
is also reimbursed for his costs in the amount (t + c). Should an injured plaintiff 
lose at trial, conversely, he must pay the defense cost k. The expected gain from 
trial for an injured plaintiff, once filing costs are sunk, equals: 
G, = WA - t + w(c + t) - (1 - w)k (10) 
This differs by an amount u = w(c + t) - (1 - w)k from the value of a valid 
claim under the American rule. The English rule increases the required settlement 
if and only if this amount is positive, which it is whenever the probability of 
liability w is greater than kl(c + t + k). Let us assume that the adoption of the 
English rule will not change the genuine plaintiff’s decision to sue. As Shavell’s 
(1982) well-known article has shown, the English rule can deter some genuine 
claims that the American rule would encourage. On the other hand, if the de- 
fendant’s costs are small relative to the plaintiff’s, or if total costs are large relative 
to the stakes, the English rule can encourage some genuine claims that the Amer- 
ican rule would deter.” Since Shave11 has analyzed these effects thoroughly, 
“TO illustrate, suppose that the total costs of litigation are approximately equal for the 
two parties (c + t = k). Then the English rule improves the position of genuine plaintiffs 
with a greater than 50% chance of winning at trial, and worsens the position of genuine 
plaintiffs with less than a 50% chance of winning at trial. 
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however, I abstract from them here, and instead focus on how an indemnification 
rule affects frivolous claims aside from any effect it has on genuine claims. It 
should be apparent that any change in the number of genuine claims brought, 
whether or not it results from the English rule, will affect in proportion the number 
of associated strike suits. 
I consider a more general class of cost shifting rules by introducing a parameter 
b E [0, 11, which represents the fraction of costs that a winning party is entitled 
to recover from the loser. Under the American rule, b = 0; under the English 
rule b = 1. An injured plaintiff can expect to gain WA - t + bu at trial, and a 
defendant would expect to pay WA + k + bu at trial if the claim is valid. By 
reasoning analogous to the previous section, the equilibrium proportion of valid 
claims is: 
WA - t + bu 
” = WA + k + bu 
The equilibrium probability of settlement would be: 
fl* = 
c 
WA - t + bu 
(11) 
(12) 
Accordingly, moving in the direction of the English rule would decrease the 
proportion of frivolous suits if and only if u > 0, that is, if the English rule would 
improve the position of a genuinely injured plaintiff. Similarly, moving in the 
direction of the English rule would decrease the equilibrium probability of settle- 
ment if and only if it improved the position of an injured plaintiff. 
Furthermore, strike suitors dissipate all the social gains from settlement under 
any cost allocation rule. Since the number of suits is iV, = po/pT, and the number 
of trials is Nr = po(l - 8), total expected litigation costs equal: 
L = pot 
WA + k + bu 
+ po(t + k) 
WA-t+bu-c 
WA - t + bu WA - t + bu 
= po(c + t + k) (13) 
and are unaffected by the choice of the financing rule. The English rule’s effects 
on the number of suits and on the number of trials exactly cancel out. 
The financing rule does, however, affect the welfare of the individual parties. 
If u > 0, a shift to the English rule will benefit injured plaintiffs and hurt defendants, 
just as it would in the absence of frivolous suits. In summary: 
PROPOSITION 7. In free entry equilibrium, a shift toward the English rule of liti- 
gation finance will: 
(a) decrease the frequency of frivolous suits if and only if an injured plaintiff 
would benefit from the English rule; 
(b) increase the frequency of trials if and only if an injured plaintiff would 
benefit from the English rule; 
(c) leave unchanged the total social costs of litigation. 
PROOF: (a) and (b): By differentiation of Equations 11 and 12 with respect to b. 
(c) By comparison of Equations 8 and 13. II 
Contrary to its proponents’ claims, the English rule provides no remedy to the 
problem of strike suits. The reason is that since strike suitors always drop out 
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before a trial, they never have to pay any defense costs. Indeed, since strike 
suitors never go to trial, there are no defense costs incurred in their cases. The 
cost of strike suits, rather, is that they create an externality by interfering with 
the settlement of other genuine claims. A simple indemnification remedy does not 
remove the externality. 
Refundable deposits or penalties 
In order to deter frivolous claims, one needs to exact a penalty not just when a 
claim is disproven at trial, but also when a claim is dropped. The simplest way 
to do this would be to require all plaintiffs to deposit an amount D when filing 
suit. The deposit could be refunded if the validity of the plaintiff’s claim is es- 
tablished at trial, or if the defendant agrees to the refund when settling. Otherwise, 
the deposit would be forfeited to the court. l8 Suppose further that even if a genuine 
plaintiff is not assured of winning at trial, the court can determine that his claim 
is not frivolous and will return his deposit. 
Once filing costs are sunk, a genuine plaintiff stands to gain either WA - t + 
D from going to trial or S + D from accepting settlement, so his reservation price 
is still WA - t. (The defendant will always agree to the return of the deposit, since 
by doing so he can offer a lower settlement.) The deposit changes the reservation 
price of the strike suitor, however, who now will pay the defendant up to the 
amount of the deposit in order to settle. 
Specifically, both plaintiff types will accept an offer of WA - t. An offer of -D 
will be accepted only by a strike suitor, and will cost the defendant pO(wA + k + 





and by the same argument as the previous section, this is the competitive equi- 
librium proportion of valid claims. Hence a higher deposit reduces the proportion 
of strike suits, because a strike suitor always loses his deposit-either to the court 
if he drops the case, or to the defendant if he settles. 





because, as above, this is the value that makes an uninjured plaintiff indifferent 
whether to sue. Since a higher deposit makes strike suits less attractive, it in- 
creases the settlement probability sustainable in equilibrium. 
l8It should be apparent that an actual deposit is not necessary, so long as the court can 
fine the plaintiff an amount equal to D if he either drops the case without settling or if his 
claim is shown in court to be frivolous. The administrative costs of collecting such a fine 
would likely be minimized, however, ifit were structured as a refundable deposit. A scheme 
which paid the deposit to the defendant upon forfeit would operate similarly. 
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It follows that total expected litigation costs equal: 
wA+k+D > + PO@ + k) WA--~--C WA-t+D WA-t+D > 
+ (t + k) wAwf ,: D 
(16) 
which is decreased by a higher deposit. As D approaches infinity, v and p1 ap- 
proach 1; a sufficiently large deposit comes arbitrarily close to the first-best out- 
come, in which only injured plaintiffs bring suit and all valid claims are settled. 
In order to deter absolutely all strike suits, however, an infinitely high deposit 
would be required. 
The problem with such a scheme is that in reality courts cannot perfectly 
determine whether a losing claim was frivolous or not, so that there is some risk 
that a genuine plaintiff will be penalized. A penalty or deposit high enough to 
deter most strike suits would deter many if not most valid claims as well. Fur- 
thermore, even if the risk is negligible that a losing valid claim will be judged 
frivolous, liquidity constraints may prevent genuine plaintiffs from bringing suit. 
Accordingly, such penalties may be of limited utility in deterring strike suits. 
4. A MODEL WITH A CONTINUUM OF PLAINTIFF TYPES 
This section briefly presents a variation on the basic model in which the amount 
of injury suffered by a genuine plaintiff can vary continuously. Accordingly, the 
defendant can choose to settle with only a subset of injured plaintiffs. It turns out 
that this formulation allows equilibria in pure strategies; nonetheless, most of the 
results of the basic model carry over in spirit. 
As before, suppose that a compensable injury in the amount of A has occurred 
with prior probability po. The filing cost and the plaintiff’s and defendant’s trial 
costs are again denoted as c, t and k respectively. As before, w denotes the 
probability that an injured plaintiff will win at trial. Let us now refer to a plaintiff’s 
probability of winning at trial as his type, and let the type w be distributed along 
the unit interval with probability density f(w) and cumulative density F(w), with 
both density functions conditional on injury having occurred.‘9 
c+t 
The injured plaintiffs fall into two groups. Those with type w L 7 are sub- 
stantially injured, and will bring suit and go to trial even if no settlement is offered. 
c+t 
Those with type w < A are only mildly injured and would not bring suit unless 
they expected some settlement to be offered. 2o Whether this second group should 
be classed with strike suitors as a normative matter is debatable. In some sense 
19As before, readers may prefer to interpret w as representing the extent of injury rather 
than the likelihood of recovery. This will not affect the results so long as the parties are 
risk-neutral. 
“The mildly injured group can be further divided into two subsets. Those plaintiffs with 
type between t/A and F would not sue unless they expected a settlement offer. Once 
they have sunk the costs of suit, however, they can credibly threaten to continue on to 
trial, and the defendant must take this into account when choosing a settlement offer. 
Those plaintiffs with type below t/A, in contrast, would never want to go to trial. From 
the defendant’s standpoint they are identical to strike suitors. 
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they may deserve compensation, since only the costs of trial interfere with their 
obtaining their entitlements. On the other hand, their injuries are mild enough 
that they would not go to trial, and they can obtain a settlement only by free 
riding on the more severely injured plaintiffs in the population. In the discussion, 
I will group them with the pure strike suitors, and refer only to the high-injury 
group as having genuine claims. 
Let 4 again denote the probability that a purely frivolous plaintiff brings suit, 
and additionally, let q(w) denote the probability that a plaintiff of type w brings 
suit. The sequential equilibrium is found by backwards induction from the last 
stage of the game. At this point, a plaintiff with type below t/A will accept any 
positive settlement offer and will drop the case if no settlement is offered. Any 
plaintiffs with type w 2 t/A, in contrast, expect a non-negative return from trial 
once filing costs are sunk. Accordingly, they will only accept a settlement offer 
at least as large as WA - t, and will reject any lower offer in favor of trial. 
The defendant, therefore, anticipates that a non-negative settlement offer in the 




Offering S therefore has an expected payout of: 
US) = s 4(1 - PO) + po 1’ q(w)@(w) (17) 
0 1 + PO &+t q(w)(wA + WF(w) 
A 
where the first term reflects the cost of accepted offers, and the second term 
reflects the cost of trial following rejected offers. The defendant chooses S to 
minimize expected payout; differentiating 17, we get the Kuhn-Tucker first-order 
condition: 




q(l - po) + po JF q(w)&-(w) 
1 
- PO 5 q(Y)f(Y) (19) 
and the boundary conditions are 0 5 S 5 A - t. Denote the settlement amount 
that satisfies 18 as S*. I assume that the second-order condition for a minimum 
is satisfied: 
L”(S) = f$? [q(y)f(y) _ !i$(q(r!$)f(!z$t) 
+ qfy)f(y))] > 0 (20) 
implying that S* minimizes the defendant’s payout. 
22 Frivolous lawsuits and litigation settlement 
Equilibrium of the continuous model 
As in the two-type model, the nature of the equilibrium depends upon whether 
the prior probability of injury exceeds a threshold equal to: 
(21) 
PROPOSITION 8. If the prior probability of injury is above a threshold level, then 
in the unique equilibrium all potential plaintiffs bring suit, and the defendant 
offers a settlement strictly greater than the plaintiff’s jiling cost. 
PROOF: Let p. > p*, and suppose all plaintiff types bring suit. Then from 19 and 
= 1 it follows that: 
L’(c) = 1 - po [I -F(Y) +Ff(Y)] = 1 -$<O (22) 
Furthermore, it follows from the second-order condition 20 that L’(S) 5 L’(c) < 
0 for any settlement offer S I c. Thus the defendant’s optimal offer S* is greater 
than c, even when all plaintiff types bring suit. It follows a fortiori that S > c 
when some frivolous plaintiffs do not sue. But then suit yields positive profits, 
so all plaintiffs will indeed sue. By continuity, there exists some S E [c, A - t] 
that satisfies 18 when q(m) = 1. The second-order condition ensures that this is a 
unique solution to 18. 11 
COROLLARY 1. The likelihood of an equilibrium in which the defendant offers a 
settlement strictly greater than the filing cost: 
(a) increases with the prior probability of injury; 
(b) increases with the costs of a defense; 
(c)falls as the filing cost rises; 
(d) is ambiguously affected both by the plaintiff’s trial costs and by the size of 
the injury. 
PROOF: Clearly, the higher is p. the more likely it is to exceed the threshold level 
p*. Differentiation of 21 shows that ap*lak < 0, that 13p*l& > 0 (from the second- 
order condition), and that the signs of ap*lat and 13p*lc?A are ambiguous. 11 
COROLLARY 2. Assuming an interior solution, the settlement amount offered in 
restricted entry equilibrium: 
(a) increases with the prior probability of injury; 
(b) increases with the costs of a defense; 
(c) is ambiguously affected both by the plaintiff’s trial costs and by the amount 
of the potential judgment. 
PROOF: An interior solution means the settlement amount is implicitly defined by 
the first-order-condition 19. Differentiating 19 with respect to S, po, k, t, and A, 
and applying the second-order-condition 20, we find that &!$*h3po > 0, &S*lak > 
0, and that dS*ldt and aS*l13A have ambiguous signs. 11 
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The underlying intuition of the proposition is that when the prior probability 
of injury is sufficiently high, the defendant prefers an offer strictly greater than 
the filing cost no matter what the uninjured plaintiffs do. This ensures that strike 
suits earn positive profits, so all plaintiffs bring suit. In contrast to the two-type 
model, however, not all cases need settle before trial. 
Proposition 8 and its corollaries correspond to Propositions 1 and 2 in Bebchuk 
(1988). The outcome is a restricted entry equilibrium, since there are not enough 
potential strike suitors to drive the profits from bringing a strike suit to the com- 
petitive level. The corollaries confirm Bebchuk’s findings that the likelihood of 
such an equilibrium, as well as the actual settlement amount, rise with the prior 
probability of injury and the defendant’s trial costs. His claims that the likelihood 
of such an equilibrium and the settlement amount rise with the plaintiff’s trial 
costs, however, are not confirmed. Specifically, an increase in the plaintiff’s trial 
costs results in two offsetting effects in restricted entry equilibrium. First, it 
increases the gain from settlement in any given case, making settlement (or a 
slight increase in the settlement offer) more attractive to the defendant; and sec- 
ond, it decreases the number of plaintiffs who would actually be willing to go to 
trial, making settlement (or a slight increase in the settlement offer) less attractive 
to the defendant. Bebchuk does not consider the second effect; when it is properly 
taken into account, the consequences of an increase in the plaintiff’s trial costs 
become ambiguous.21 
When the prior probability of injury is below the threshold p*, conversely, the 
restricted entry equilibrium does not obtain. Instead, there is a generically unique 
set of competitive equilibria in which free entry by strike suitors drives the equi- 
librium settlement offer down to an amount just sufficient to cover the cost of 
filing suit. 
PROPOSITION 9. If the prior probability of injury is below a threshold level, then 
in equilibrium: 
(a) All genuinely injured plaintiffs bring suit; 
(b) Some but not all potential strike suitors bring suit; 
(c) All frivolous plaintiffs settle for an amount equal to their filing costs, and 
all plaintiffs with valid claims go to trial. 
PROOF: An equilibrium is determined by values of S and q(o) that are best responses 
to each other. Let p0 < p*, and first suppose that S > c. Then all plaintiffs’ returns 
from suit are strictly positive, so q(w) = 1 for all w. But then L’(S) > L’(c) = 
1 - p,,/p* > 0, so the defendant wants to choose S < c, which contradicts the 
supposition. Conversely, suppose S < c. Then a frivolous plaintiff’s return from 
c+t 
suit is strictly negative, so q(w) = 0 for all w < - 
A ’ 
But then L’(S) = 0 for all 
S < c, and L’(c) < 0, so that the defendant wants to choose S > c, again a 
contradiction. A similar argument shows that neither q(w) = 0 nor q(w) = 1 for 
all w can be an equilibrium. By continuity, there exist values of q(a) B 0 and < 
1 (not necessarily unique) such that L’(c) = 0. Since frivolous plaintiffs are 
*‘The discrepancy between my results and Bebchuk’s seems to originate in a difference 
of notation. In my framework, the plaintiff’s type corresponds to the gross return expected 
at trial; in Bebchuk’s framework the plaintiff’s type corresponds to the net return after 
trial costs are subtracted. Bebchuk’s notation is more compact, but has the disadvantage 
that a change in the trial costs should cause a shift in his entire probability distribution of 
types. Apparently, he overlooks this shift in the distribution when taking the derivatives 
to his Equations 7 and 9-the counterparts to my Equations 19 and 21. 
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indifferent whether to sue when S = c, such values of q(a) are a best response to 
an offer of c, so this is an equilibrium. Any genuine plaintiff will bring suit, reject 
the offer of c, and go to trial. 11 
While the competitive equilibrium is not unique with respect to the identity of 
the strike suitors, the equilibrium number and proportion of strike suitors are 
uniquely determined. From the first-order-condition 19, the equilibrium number 
c+, 
of strike suitors is [q(l - pO) + p. JoA q(w)dF(w)] = . The 
number of seriously injured plaintiffs, recall, was p. ( 1 - F (T)) . Hence the 
equilibrium proportion of genuine claims is: 
(23) 
Comparative statics 
In competitive equilibrium, rent-seeking drives the settlement amount down to 
the filing cost. Changes in the other exogenous variables have no effect on equi- 
librium S*, but do affect the equilibrium proportion of frivolous suits: 
PROPOSITION 10. In competitive equilibrium, the proportion offrivolous lawsuits: 
(a) is invariant to the prior probability of injury; 
(b) increases with the trial costs of the defendant; 
(c) is ambiguously affected by the plaintiff’s trial costs, the filing cost, and by 
the amount of the potential judgment. 
PROOF: By differentiation of Equation 23. 11 
The effect of the prior probability of injury and the defendant’s trial costs on 
the proportion of frivolous suits is the same in the continuous model as in the 
two-type model presented in the text. The effects of the variables c, t, and A that 
arise in the two-type model are also present with a continuum of types. In the 
continuous model, however, these last variables also change the threshold 
c+t 
- that determines whether a plaintiff of type w is frivolous or genuine. The 
A 
net effect on the proportion of frivolous suits is therefore ambiguous.22 
Analysis of social welfare 
The welfare consequences of competitive equilibrium in the continuous model 
are even more striking than those of the two-type model. Because all frivolous 
suits settle for their filing costs and all genuine suits go on to trial, all plaintiff 
types get the same level of welfare as they would were there no settlement at all. 
Defendants, however, are strictly worse off than if there were no settlement; they 
c+t 
221f one ignores the effect that arises from changing the threshold - 
A ’ 
the comparative 
statics of the continuous model are identical to those described for the two-type model in 
the text. 
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must pay the costs of going to trial against genuine plaintiffs, and, in addition, 
they must pay the filing costs of all frivolous plaintiffs. Accordingly, the net social 
costs of litigation would actually be decreased if settlement were forbidden. Rent- 
seeking by strike suitors dissipates an amount in excess of the surplus from 
settlement bargaining. 
Example: uniform distribution 
To illustrate, suppose that the plaintiff’s type w is uniformly distributed along the 
unit interval following an injury, so that f(w) = 1 and F(w) = w. It follows that 
the second-order-condition is satisfied. The threshold probability of injury nec- 




ever the filing cost is less than the defense cost, as seems likely, this threshold 
will be contained in [0, l] and increasing in A, so that buying off all strike suitors 
is less attractive when the potential stakes are higher. In this case, S = k + 
A 
( > 
1 - i , so that higher plaintiffs trial cost has no effect on the settlement 
amount, and higher stakes actually lower the settlement amount in restricted entry 
equilibrium. When filing costs exceed defense costs, this threshold probability 
exceeds one, so the equilibrium must be a competitive one. 
In competitive equilibrium, the equilibrium proportion of genuine suits is 
,_A-c-t 
P - A-c+k’ 
This proportion is increasing in the stakes A, and decreasing 
in all manner of costs. Accordingly, frivolous suits make up a smaller proportion 
of suits when the potential stakes are higher, and a larger proportion when litigation 
costs are higher. 
As an arithmetic example, suppose that plaintiff’s and defendant’s trial costs 
t and k each amount to one-sixth of the potential stakes A, and that the filing costs 
c are close to zero. Then there would be a restricted entry equilibrium if the prior 
probability of injury were greater than 6/7, and a competitive equilibrium other- 
wise. In competitive equilibrium, 217 of all claims would be frivolous. If each 
party’s trial costs increased to one-fourth of the potential stakes, there would be 
a restricted entry equilibrium if the prior probability of injury were greater than 
80%, and in competitive equilibrium 40% of all claims would be frivolous. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This article analyzes the equilibrium suit and settlement strategies of parties to a 
lawsuit when there is a possibility that the suit is frivolous. Because the defendant 
does not know whether a given lawsuit is frivolous or genuine, he may choose a 
strategy that leads to the settlement of frivolous claims or the trial of genuine 
ones. It turns out that a situation in which it is common knowledge that the plaintiff 
may drop the suit looks very different from one in which the plaintiff’s threat to 
go to trial is credible. Several conclusions follow from the analysis. 
First, so long as there are no barriers to bringing suit, it will generally be the 
case that some proportion of suits are frivolous. The reason for this is that if there 
were no frivolous suits brought, defendants would find it in their interest to offer 
substantial amounts in settlement. Such high offers, however, encourage the bring- 
ing of strike suits. Moreover, the number of frivolous suits as a proportion of all 
suits is unaffected by the frequency of genuine claims in the population of potential 
plaintiffs. 
Second, the proportion of frivolous suits is directly related to both sides’ trial 
costs. The prospect of an expensive trial will make the defendant a softer bar- 
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gainer, leading him to tolerate a higher proportion of frivolous suits in equilibrium. 
Similarly, the proportion of strike suits is inversely related to the size of the 
potential judgment, since the higher stakes reduces the relative importance of trial 
costs and makes the defendant a harder bargainer. This suggests, for instance, 
that proposals to reduce the number of frivolous suits by detrebling antitrust 
damages may be misplaced. 
Third, frivolous suits lead to at least two sorts of social costs. The first is the 
real resource cost involved in filing such suits. The second is the cost of the trials 
required because the presence of strike suitors prevents some genuine claims from 
settling. If there is free entry to bringing a frivolous suit, the entire surplus from 
the settlement of genuine claims can be dissipated. In the basic model of section 
3, the increased costs arising from frivolous claims are equivalent to the costs 
that would be suffered if settlement were actually prohibited. When the merits of 
the claim can vary continuously, as in Section 4, banning settlement could actually 
reduce the costs of litigation. 
Fourth, policies proposed to remedy the problem of frivolous lawsuits generally 
have undesirable effects on the disposition of genuine claims. For example, the 
English rule of litigation finance, which requires the losing party to indemnify the 
winner for the cost of litigation, may reduce the frequency of frivolous suits. It 
does so, however, only by interfering with the settlement of meritorious suits and 
reducing the amount received by injured plaintiffs. Moreover, its total litigation 
costs are on balance no less than under the American rule in which each party 
must pay his own costs. Similarly, requiring each plaintiff to put up a refundable 
deposit that is forfeited if the suit is dropped will reduce total litigation costs, but 
is likely to prevent some genuine liquidity-constrained plaintiffs from obtaining 
compensation. 
Settlement negotiation in lawsuits is obviously a complicated process, and these 
results warrant further investigation. An interesting extension of this model would 
consider situations where the plaintiff rather than the defendant makes the set- 
tlement offer. This would complicate matters by allowing the defendant to draw 
inferences not just from the fact of suit but also from the amount requested. 
Another realistic extension would be to allow multiple settlement offers, both 
before and at various points during the course of litigation. Preliminary results 
from research in progress suggest that much of the spirit of the single-offer model 
carries over to the multiple-offer case. 
The paper also abstracts from a number of interesting aspects of settlement 
bargaining that should provide fertile ground for further research. For example, 
the model omits any mention of civil discovery, the process whereby a party can 
compel his adversary to turn over private information regarding the merits of the 
case. The opportunity to engage in discovery, at a cost, further enriches the 
litigants’ strategies. It would also be useful to incorporate in the analysis the 
contingent fee, whereby the plaintiff’s attorney agrees to be compensated by a 
percentage of the verdict or settlement. While the contingent fee has been criti- 
cized for its supposed contribution to the increase in litigation, the truth may be 
more complicated. The fact that an attorney is willing to take a percentage of a 
case as his compensation may be a good signal that the case has merit; accordingly, 
contingent fees may help to channel meritorious cases toward settlement, while 
screening out some frivolous claims.23 
230n the basis of this conjecture, Judge Richard Posner dissented from an opinion providing 
state-appointed counsel to an indigent prisoner who wished to bring a medical malpractice 
suit against the prison physician. Posner reasoned that had the suit been meritorious, it 
would have been accepted by a private attorney on a contingent fee basis. See Merritt v. 
Faulkner, 697 F. 2d 761 (7th Cir., 1983). 
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In summary, the incentives for settlement and negotiation in actual lawsuits 
are complex, and my results and recommendations should be taken as tentative. 
On the other hand, recent critics of the American legal system have been quite 
willing to make their own recommendations for its reform on efficiency grounds. 
My results also suggest that one should be cautious in applying “common sense” 
prescriptions for the judicial process that are not carefully based on an explicit 
theoretical model. This paper is intended as a step toward that goal. 
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